



FOCUS GROUP

CABO DELGADO INSURGENCY

Intelligence Briefing

19 August 2020



Company Information

FOCUS GROUP

ABOUT US



FOCUS GROUP is a diversified, intelligence-led risk management company. We advise on, execute and deliver risk management solutions using a holistic and pro-active approach with the objective of helping our clients become more resilient in an increasingly complex, global and digitalised risk environment. With over **21 years of hands-on experience dealing with complex risk and security situations; 10 years experience on the ground in Mozambique.**

We provide appropriate risk scenarios to help clients at strategic decision-making and operational levels to identify, understand and mitigate risk, as well as to respond to crisis situations. This is achieved through our wide and well-established network in combination with our deep appreciation for the cultural complexities, diversity, and nuances in the countries we operate.

RHULA INTELLIGENT SOLUTIONS is a fully licenced Mozambican company founded almost a decade ago. Rhula Intelligent Solutions is the operating entity of Focus Group in Mozambique. 51% of the company is owned by our local Mozambican partners and 49% by Focus Group.

FOCUS GROUP

ABOUT US



- Over 20 years of experience operating in challenging environments
- Worked in 47 of 54 African countries
- Highly experienced in-house analyst team interpreting information and data
- Advanced data analysis software to research the web, deep and dark web
- In-house risk management personnel deployed in countries of operation
- Deep understanding of the cultural nuances and diversity in countries of operation

FOCUS GROUP

KEY PERSONNEL



Joe van Der Walt (CEO)

Founder of Focus Group. With a background in the defence force of the South African military (10 years in the military and Ops intelligence, resigned as Captain), Joe has specialised in private-sector security and risk management in Africa and the Middle-East for over 20 years. He has particular expertise in the oil, gas and mining sectors and has planned, coordinated and implemented operations in Sub-Sahara, East and West Africa, as well as the oil fields of Kurdish-controlled Northern Iraq, and Asia. Joe has been responsible for the implementation and management of high-level security for asset protection and personnel involving several multinationals operating in Africa and the Middle-East. He has delivered high-level threat assessments, including one for a major gas line construction project in the United States of America.

Col (Ret) Koos Sadie (Director of Operations)

Koos Sadie spent 28 years as a professional soldier in the SADF/SANDF from 1974 to 2002. His first seven years were spent in the Infantry Corps, serving in different Infantry Battalions in Namibia and South Africa. In 1982 he started his 21-year intelligence career, as a staff officer with the SA Special Forces. In due course he progressed to become Chief Instructor at the SA Army School of Intelligence and later to Chief Instructor Intelligence at the South African Army College. Koos Sadie was seconded to the Chilean Army War College, where he functioned as the Chief Instructor for Operations and Tactics. On his return, he became the Project Manager for the SA Army War Gaming Centre at the SA Army College. Between 1994 and 2002 Koos Sadie functioned as a Senior Staff Officer Operational Intelligence responsible for the internal covert collection function of the SANDF reporting to Chief of Defence Intelligence. After leaving the SANDF in 2002, Koos Sadie became a Project Manager with the National Institute Community Development and Management (NICDAM) and later the Head of Learner Assessment Centre at (NICDAM).

FOCUS GROUP

KEY PERSONNEL

Major (Ret) John Lombard *(Mozambique Country Manager)*

Commander of counter insurgency forces for five years, 101 Battalion (SANDF – Angolan War). Trained, mobilised and deployed with SA Infantry battalion to Burundi as acting commander. Left SANDF with the rank of Major for Counter Insurgency operations in middle east for ten years. Involved in insurgency analyses in Cabo Delgado since 2017.

Lt. Col (Ret) Theunis Marais *(Information Manager)*

Commander of counter insurgency operations (32 Battalion) and later specialised in military intelligence (SANDF – Angolan War). Left the SANDF after 17 years as a Lieutenant Colonel and became military advisor to Angolan Forces (FAA) that included formal intelligence training to the senior military staff of FAA and developing the Strategic Aerial Reconnaissance capability of FAA. Involved in insurgency analyses of the Cabo Delgado insurgency since 2017.

FOCUS GROUP

IN-HOUSE ANALYSIS TEAM

FOCUS GROUP

Research & Analysis Department

Focus Group has an experienced in-house analyst team, specialising in a variety of fields and skillsets including statistical data analysis, political analysis and criminal behaviour. The team is highly qualified with degrees ranging from Honours to Masters level and has worked on numerous projects, with decades of cumulative experience between them. The Department specialises in interpreting information and data as well as utilising advanced data analysis software to provide in-depth understanding to facilitate navigation of complex situations in an informed and logical manner.

INFORMATION COLLECTION MANAGEMENT – OUR APPROACH

INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Dissemination and Feedback

- **Intelligence Products** shared with relevant stakeholders
- The intelligence is **evaluated** to determine if all elements of the **Intel Problem** are solved

Analysis and Production

- The collation, evaluation, integration and interpretation of information to **Develop Valuable Intelligence**
- Conducting an **Intel Appreciation** of the problem
- Developing **Finished Intelligence Products** for known or anticipated purposes and applications

Processing

- Converting collected information into a form suitable for producing intelligence
- **Data cleaning and management**



Planning and Direction

- Planning the **Collection Effort** and formulating the **Intel Problem**
- Determination and prioritisation of **Intelligence Requirements** (Essential Elements of Information – EEIs)

Collection

- Developing and executing the **Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP)**
- Converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements and tasking sources for **Collection Management**

INFORMATION COLLECTION MANAGEMENT – OUR APPROACH

SOURCE CLASSIFICATION AND INFORMATION RELIABILITY

- Tasking of sources (HUMINT) is done in parallel networks to determine information credibility
- All sources are registered on a centralised register after a three-month evaluation period
- HUMINT highly valuable

SOURCE CLASSIFICATION	
Rating	Description
A – Reliable	No doubt about the source's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency. History of complete reliability.
B – Usually Reliable	Minor doubts. History of mostly valid information.
C – Fairly Reliable	Doubts. Provided valid information in the past.
D – Not Usually Reliable	Significant doubts. Provided valid information in the past.
E – Unreliable	Lacks authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency. History of invalid information.
F – Cannot Be Judged	Insufficient information to evaluate reliability. May or may not be reliable.



INFORMATION RELIABILITY	
Rating	Description
1 – Confirmed	Logical, consistent with other relevant information, confirmed by independent sources.
2 – Probably True	Logical, consistent with other relevant information, not confirmed.
3 – Possibly True	Reasonably logical, agrees with some relevant information, not confirmed.
4 – Doubtfully True	Not logical but possible, no other information on the subject, not confirmed.
5 – Improbable	Not logical, contradicted by other relevant information.
6 – Cannot Be Judged	The validity of the information cannot be determined.



Cabo Delgado – Mozambique

CABO DELGADO

OVERVIEW



ETHNIC GROUPS

MOZAMBIQUE – CABO DELGADO

Makonde	Cabo Delgado = mainly Makonde Mainly inhabit northern Mozambique and Southern Tanzania Closely related to Makonde in Tanzania – linguistic & cultural differences
Mwani	The Mwani/Swahili people occupy the northern parts of the country. They maintain a cultural difference that is specific to other Swahilis in Kenya, Tanzania the Zanzibar archipelago. They follow Islam and wear traditional Islam attire.




RELIGION

MOZAMBIQUE

FOCUS GROUP

	Roman Catholic
	Muslim
	Zionist Christian
	Protestant
	Other
	None/Unspecified



- About half of country adhere to some form of **Christianity**
- Less than one-fifth are **Muslim**
- **Muslim majority** in **northern coastal region**
- Most of East Africa is traditionally Muslim
- Mozambique has **moderate social hostilities** involving religion (rating lower than global median score)



RELIGION

RADICAL ISLAM ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT





The Problem – Cabo Delgado Insurgency

THE PROBLEM

The Mozambique Government is grappling with an intensifying, low-level, Islamic insurgency in parts of the gas-rich province of **Cabo Delgado**. Since May 2017, attacks against security forces have been reported in both open source media and from closed sources.


While localised, the risk that it will spread to other districts of the province and other provinces of the country remains high.

Recent claims made by the Islamic State declaring their presence in the area complicates the threat.

The Mozambique Defence Force (FDS) has so far been incapable of successfully dealing with the insurgency.

INSURGENCY BACKGROUND

THE ESCALATION OF CONFLICT



FALL OF MOCÍMBOA DA PRAIA

MULTI-PRONGED ATTACK ON MOCÍMBOA DA PRAIA TOWN (5 to 11 August)



TERRORISM IN MOZAMBIQUE

CABO DELGADO IS A SIGNIFICANT CASE IN GLOBAL TERRORISM

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
Global Terrorism Index 2019

Mozambique

25
138 countries

Medium Risk

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM



- 2018 (40/138) → 2019 (25/138) **up by 15 places**
- Other than Afghanistan only three other countries recorded a substantial increase in deaths from terrorism in 2018: Nigeria, Mali, and **Mozambique**. Each of these countries recorded more than 100 additional deaths.
- Insurgents are very likely to try to carry out **more sophisticated attacks** in Mozambique, possibly at higher frequency and attempt to activate more districts in Cabo Delgado.
- Presence of **Islamic State** affiliated fighters (**Islamic State Central Africa Province**) since 2019. Joining the ASWJ insurgency.
- Increasing weapons capability.



Analysis

THREAT UPDATE (5 Oct 2017-12 Aug 2020)


INSURGENCY BY NUMBERS



October 2017 saw the beginning of violent incidents and armed incursions involving the suspected terrorist group. Since then, there have been at least **507** reported militant-orchestrated incidents.

In June 2019, the Islamic State (through the ISCAP) claimed credit for an attack in **Mocímboa da Praia**, since then approximately **40 incidents** have been claimed by the terrorist organisation.


The active conflict zone in the province is considered a **VERY HIGH RISK** for armed incursions and clashes between the group(s) and security, as well as incidents of kidnapping, arson, theft, and/or destruction of property.




SECURITY INCIDENTS

INCIDENT STATISTICS

Most of the **security incidents** have been initiated by insurgents




Increasing number of incidents and fatalities



SECURITY INCIDENTS



INCIDENT STATISTICS

Militant-orchestrated incidents, per month *Jan 2019 - 12 Aug 2020*




CURRENT SITUATION

HIGH RISK DISTRICTS – 2020




Very high risk of security-related incidents in **Macomia, Mocimboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Nangade and Quissanga.**

Elevated to high risk of security-related incidents in **Palma and Meluco.**



SECURITY INCIDENTS


CABO DELGADO – MILITANT-ORCHESTRATED AND COUNTER INSURGENCY




SECURITY INCIDENTS

MODUS OPERANDI – VILLAGE ATTACKS AND ROADSIDE AMBUSHES

Attacks on villages, per year; more attacks occurring in the south of the conflict zone in 2020



Location of roadside ambushes, per year




SECURITY INCIDENTS

MODUS OPERANDI – LARGESCALE ATTACKS (DISTRICT CAPITALS)

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Frequency of largescale militant-led incidents is increasing

Attacks on district headquarters in 2020



Following 6 days of fighting with security forces, insurgents seized control of Mocimboa da Praia Town (district capital) and its port on 11 August 2020

This incident represents a marked development in the insurgency

Reports of 1000+ insurgents
Significant fatalities (unknown)
Reports of mortars being used in attack
RPGs used to sink vessels
Security forces abandoning area
Marines running out of ammunition

DAG insufficient Time Over Target – refuelling in Pemba



SECURITY AND RISK

MOZAMBIQUE

SITREP

200812-ARA001

AFTER DAYS OF FIGHTING IN MOCIMBOA DA PRAIA, INSURGENTS TAKE CONTROL OVER TOWN AND PORT

Source	Open and Closed	Validity	Unconfirmed	Related Alerts	None
5-11 August 2020					
Armed Attacks					
Actor 1 – Insurgents & FDS					
Actor 2 – Civilians, FDS & Insurgents					
Mocimboa da Praia & Macomia					

INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

A continuous multi-pronged attack on Mocimboa da Praia Town has resulted in the capture of the town's heavily defended port by insurgents and has left the town all but deserted by local residents.

On Thursday last week (6 August), reliable source information indicated that insurgents entered Mocimboa da Praia during Wednesday night (5 August), while additional source information states that the insurgents conducted an unexpected infiltration, from the 'inside out', taking the Defence and Security Force (FDS) elements, deployed in the town, by surprise. The offensive reportedly started with an attack on the village of Anga, located near the coast, about 10 kilometres southeast of Mocimboa da Praia. Homes were looted and burned down, and an unknown number of residents were kidnapped.

Over the course of that night, insurgents also attacked 1 de Malo and Awasse, before beginning an assault on outlying sections of Mocimboa da Praia Town at around 04:00 the next morning. In the subsequent days, sources close to the situation indicated that the insurgents and security forces were engaged in heavy conflict across Mocimboa da Praia. According to a pro-government site, the security forces repelled an insurgent attack in Mocimboa da Praia on 6 August. This account indicated that the security forces responded swiftly to the attack that started around 04:00 in the morning, forcing the insurgents to retreat. The counter-offensive reportedly resulted in 16 insurgent deaths.

However, the supposed 'ease' at which the security forces pushed back the insurgents was countered by events in the following days, showcasing the insurgents' domination in the region. The account of a security force victory was also contradicted by a claim issued by the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), stating that the group's fighters killed and wounded 50 Mozambican soldiers as well as overran two military bases in the vicinity of Mocimboa da Praia. Mozambican officials have not yet commented on this alleged incident.

The fight over Mocimboa da Praia persisted throughout the week, with sporadic clashes between insurgents and security forces being reported. Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) helicopters responded to the battle, supporting ground forces. Unconfirmed information suggests that a number of insurgents were killed as a result of helicopter gunfire, however, this remains unverified.

By 8 August, sources reported that fighting in the town and surrounding areas was ongoing, while cell phone reception was inaccessible, and power was out in the area (the power outages reportedly extended towards Palma). According to unverified information, the insurgents were targeting Chinese-owned businesses, particularly sawmills, during their raids. On the same day, reports indicated that government troops pulled out of Ntoute, a village on the N380 between Mocimboa da Praia and Awasse, reportedly sending the troops to Mueda.

Later that day, fighting began to include Mocimboa da Praia town's north-eastern suburbs, with insurgents also attacking Nkomangano. At the end of the week, insurgents were in control of the vital N380 crossroad town of Awasse, in western Mocimboa da Praia District, as well as other parts of Mocimboa da Praia Town.

‘KNOW YOUR ENEMY’

HOME GROWN GROUP

FOCUS GROUP

While there is a strong extremist Islamist dimension to the insurgency, there may be different motives and incentives derived from many multi-layered drivers of insecurity

Group terrorising the region since 2017 has been called various names – as yet no confirmed information as to who they are, what their motives are and who their leader is

Islamic State claims of their presence in the area complicates the effort to understand the situation

Ahlu Sunnah wa-Jama (ASWJ)

is loosely translated as “The Traditionalists” or as the “Followers of the Sunnah and the Mosque.” A former Iraqi terror group and a moderate Somali militia also have used that name. Pledged allegiance to Islamic State.

‘Al-Shabaab’

a name that is identical to the Somali insurgent group, shows up in media and government reports, but there is no indication that group members refer to themselves that way. Also, no known affiliation with the Somali group exists.

Swahili Sunnah

which could be translated as “The Swahili Followers of the Sunnah” or “The Swahili Custom or Path” applies to coastal Mwani and other Swahili speakers and differentiates their identity from other groups living in Mozambique’s interior and the government to the south.

Ansar al-Sunnah

is an early reference to the group and could indicate links to a Tanzanian group of this name.


‘KNOW YOUR ENEMY’

ISLAMIC STATE

- Following the loss of most of its territory in Iraq and Syria – the Islamic State seems to be gearing towards establishing some form of a new physical caliphate in other regions with current terrorist/militant activity (i.e. DRC and Mozambique)
- The **Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP)** now appears to be operating in DRC and Mozambique. ISCAP has claimed **over 40 attacks** in Cabo Delgado to date (05 08 2020).
- It is difficult to ascertain their links to the militant attacks which have been taking place since May 2017 but communication between the groups is clear. Complicates the threat in the region.
- Expansionist ideology.
- Threatened against South African involvement in the conflict.



40+ attacks claimed by Islamic State




Only IS claims with confirmed geographical coordinates are represented on the map



عاجل ولاية وسط إفريقية الخميس 22 ذي القعدة 1440 هـ

بتوفيق الله تعالى، تمكّن جنود الخلافة من مصادمة منازل عملاء ومتعاونين مع جيش موزمبيق الصليبي في قرية (مكول) بمنطقة (موسيمبوا دا برايا)، حيث قتلوا أربعة عناصر بأسلحتهم الرشاشة وأحرقوا عددا من منازل المرتدين جزاء لهم لموالاتهم للصليبيين ومحاربة الموحدين، ولله الحمد.



وكالة أعماق: إحراق منازل للنصارى أول أمس، إثر اقتحام مقاتلي الدولة الإسلامية قرية "ليشي" التابعة لمقاطعة "نانغادي" في إقليم "كابو ديلجاو" بموزمبيق

أعماق
الإخبارية

11/08/2019



‘KNOW YOUR ENEMY’

INSURGENT COURSE OF ACTION AND TACTICS

MODUS OPERANDI	INSURGENT TACTICS
COMMAND AND CONTROL	Decentralised Command and Control from three geographical areas being Narere (Central), Nangade (North) and Cagembe (South) Group insurgent forces for larger attacks on strategic towns and FDS bases Terror attacks (beheadings, killings) focused on villages that are not supportive of insurgency for religious, ethnic and logistics reasons
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM	Sources among local population close to FDS bases Information sources within in FDS Use women to befriend FDS for tactical information Agents in Government structures Disinform / mislead population on insurgent's tactical intentions

'KNOW YOUR ENEMY'

INSURGENT COURSE OF ACTION AND TACTICS

MODUS OPERANDI	INSURGENT TACTICS
MULTIPLE ATTACKS IN ONE DAY	Use motorcycles Use own and looted vehicles Travel on main roads, day and night Travel as civilians with public transport in civilian dress
ATTACKS IN ANY CORNER OF CONFLICT ZONE	Have three safe / permanent bases in Central, North, and Southern areas of the conflict zone Have temporary bases in proximity of intended targets Effective in grouping and dispersing of fighter groups
WEAPONS	Use light infantry weapons. AK 47's, PKM's, RPG 7's, 82- and 60-mm mortars Looted armoured vehicles Store looted ammunition and heavy weapons in safe/permanent base Possibly in possession of SAM 7 missile

‘KNOW YOUR ENEMY’

INSURGENT COURSE OF ACTION AND TACTICS

MODUS OPERANDI	INSURGENT TACTICS
RECRUITMENT	Forced recruitment of local male youths – threat of beheadings Kidnapping of women for cooking in bases, sex and logistic supplies Foreign fighters (albeit unconfirmed and few)
LOGISTICS	Use women and children to carry supplies behind combat groups Loot supplies from towns and villages Transport supplies in “dhows” and own vehicles Use women and children to buy supplies in towns

'KNOW YOUR ENEMY'

INSURGENT COURSE OF ACTION AND TACTICS

MODUS OPERANDI	INSURGENT TACTICS
INSURGENTS USE FDS UNIFORMS	Insurgents move freely among locals to collect information and or to move between their targets and base areas Insurgents neutralise close air support for FDS troops, by confusing air crews as to who own forces are on the ground and who are not Discrediting FDS by acting out atrocities, by pretending to be FDS Entering/penetrating FDS bases, unnoticed for final or close up reconnaissance Other pseudo operations. Close/final recon of targets Less restrictions to access especially combat information
ATTACK LARGE AND SMALL FDS BASES	Insurgents have good sources of information within FDS, within several important FDS bases Reliable insurgent info sources in proximity of FDS bases, among the local population Operational and tactical planning information of the FDS deployments is leaked from the FDS HQs, to the insurgents Local population fear and 'respect' the insurgents in areas where FDS bases had been overrun by the insurgents in the resent past (i.e. local civilians cannot be trusted for their loyalty to the Government forces in these areas)

'KNOW YOUR ENEMY'

INSURGENT COURSE OF ACTION AND TACTICS

MODUS OPERANDI	INSURGENT TACTICS
71% OF INSURGENT ATTACKS ON FDS BASES AND VILLAGES EXECUTED BETWEEN 18:00 AND 06:00	Insurgents travel in civilian dress (and FDS uniforms) to the proximity of their targets during the day Insurgents reconnoitre their intended targets during daylight to be able to execute night operations After attacks the insurgents disappear from the proximity of the targeted area under the cover of darkness and by day light melt into the local population in civilian dress, hiding their weapons and combat fatigues
ABLE TO SUSTAIN AN AVERAGE OF ONE ATTACK PER DAY	Insurgents attack targets that are far apart simultaneously to 1) split FDS forces 2) distract FDS forces from areas where insurgents aim to attack next 3) prevent FDS forces from concentrating their efforts in important insurgent strongholds Temporary insurgent bases move/are vacated rapidly (minutes), should they detect any risk of the location becoming known to FDS forces. The opposite will be true when they feel safe and undetected and will return to these basis after attacking their targets in the area

'KNOW YOUR ENEMY'

INSURGENT COURSE OF ACTION AND TACTICS

MODUS OPERANDI	INSURGENT TACTICS
ABLE TO SUSTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF SURPRISE (ATTACKS ON VILLAGES, FDS BASES AND GOVERNMENT FACILITIES)	Tactical information on insurgent movements, intentions and locations coming from locals and even the FDS will be unreliable and likely misleading Insurgents will attack FDS bases that are under strength, due to patrols being out in the field or for any other reason

‘KNOW YOUR ENEMY’

INSURGENT STRENGTHS

- **Groups of between 5 to 1000** (depending on target i.e. reports of 1000 in last attack on Mocímboa da Praia and smaller groups of 30 to 100 attack FDS bases)
 - Previous attack on Mocímboa da Praia supported by at least 40 insurgents from the sea.
 - Size of attacking groups have grown substantially in 2020
- Ability to engage in **multiple targets** and conduct **multi-pronged attacks**
 - Land and maritime capability
- Ability to sustain the insurgency in **8 of 17 districts** for most of the insurgency period (at least 2 years; Quissanga 2020)
- **Up-arming** of all insurgents from ‘white weapons’ to AK 47’s and other light and medium weaponry (i.e. mortars, RPG’s, PKM’s etc.)
- **Collection of tactical and operation information** on FDS progressed to a level where key military bases and towns were successfully occupied by ‘inferior’ insurgent forces (numbers and weaponry – pre August 2020 attack)
- **Highly mobile**, using public transport, motorcycles, looted armoured and other FDS vehicles, carrying light weaponry and operating from temporary bases in the proximity of their target areas

‘KNOW YOUR ENEMY’

INSURGENT STRENGTHS

- Home ground advantage – familiar with territory people, culture, who to trust, etc.
 - Element of **surprise**
- High rate of **security force desertion** – possibly joining the insurgency
- FDS brutality (winning the **hearts and minds**)
- Islamic State **propaganda** (claiming attacks)
 - International exposure
 - Local group(s) don't have the same platform
- Intimidation of community (**community fear factor**)
- Possibility of **forward observation posts** cannot be excluded

'KNOW YOUR ENEMY'

LIMITED ACCESS – STRATEGIC ROUTES

Movement in conflict zone dependent on **blue routes**

Blue routes now very high risk or closed

Access to Palma – routes now reliant on untarred roads – **red routes**


- Time to conflict zone
- Surprise element lost

Cells are strategically placed – can reach anywhere in conflict

- **Southern cell** can be in Quissanga in a number of hours
- **Northern cell** can reach Palma in hours
- 50-70kms

Strategic location of Mocímboa da Praia

- Main roads come together



INSURGENCY

INTELLIGENCE GAPS

ASPECT	INTELLIGENCE GAP	KNOWN INFO
DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS GROUPS	Cooperation / interaction between the religious groups	Al Sunnah Wa-Jamma (ASWJ), 'Al-Shabaab', Swahili Sunnah and Ansar Al Sunna home grown. Islamic State is the foreign entity. Conflict erupted from home grown elements.
	Will the different religious groups pose a more cohesive militant threat in the future or will the conflict evolve (as seen in Mali and Somalia)?	Ideological differences ASWJ – Quranic Islamic State – Hadith
DRIVING FORCE BEHIND ATTACKS	Quantifiable and verified information on the principle and secondary drivers of this conflict is proving to be elusive. <i>For example, how do the substantial illicit trades in the province feed into the religious agenda of the radicals.</i> Who are the principle individuals (leaders) involved and what are their motives	Insurgency 2017-mid 2019 with no sign of Islamic State – local issues and radical Islamic ideas confluence. Post June 2019, Islamic State claims to credit = intensifying conflict Radical cleric influence

INSURGENCY

INTELLIGENCE GAPS

ASPECT	INTELLIGENCE GAP	KNOWN INFO
FOREIGN AND LOCAL LINKS	Support from inside conflict zone	Single source info alludes to Muslim businessman
		ISCAP ADF training in Cabo Delgado
COMMAND AND CONTROL	Structure of command and control	Tactical and operational decisions becoming clearer but little known We do know the Northern, Central and Southern cells Decentralised decision making of the cells (autonomous operations) Centralised command for large attacks
	Protocols applied for decision making	Islamic State agenda can now be considered
GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION	At this time, it is not known what the security establishment in Mozambique can expect from the militant elements in terms of their desire (or not), to expand their geographical area of operations towards the West or further South.	The borders of the conflict zone have held steady with no attacks outside of the 8 districts that have so far suffered multiple attacks since October of 2017

INSURGENCY

INTELLIGENCE GAPS

ASPECT	INTELLIGENCE GAP	KNOWN INFO
SUPPLY OF WEAPONS	No indication of a formal supply line of weaponry of any kind has been reported	Arms and weapons claimed by Islamic State to have been looted from the statutory forces
		Over time the insurgents progressed from carrying white weapons (knives, machetes etc) and one or two AK 47's per insurgent group to AK 47's carried by almost every insurgent with light platoon weapons such as PKM's, 82 and 60 mm Mortars, RPG 7's and 2's (SAM7 – know they have it, unknown of whereabouts)
		Several anecdotal information reports however indicate that rogue elements of the statutory forces have sold ammunition, and/or leased their weapons to known insurgents
FINANCIAL SUPPORT	Up to date no concrete evidence has been forthcoming on any substantial funding of these groups from external sources/donors.	Local <i>Mpesa</i> system to obtain funds, funds could be generated from the illicit trades (<i>ivory, timber, rubies, drugs etc.</i>) and it has been alleged that businesses from Sofala Province also donate funds to some of these groups. Suspected links to South Africa with money being sent to Mozambique Links to Islamic State funding can be considered

RESPONSE

GOVERNMENT, FADM, WAGNER, DAG, SURROUNDING COUNTRIES

- Response to the threat was **slow from the Mozambique Government**, to publicly admit to the existence and severity of the insurgency in Cabo Delgado. The public admission only came late in 2019.
- **Dismissed** as criminal banditry, then organised crime, **now blaming foreign forces only** and ‘waving’ Islamic State flag.
- It was only in **May 2020 that the sub-region (SADC)** and the International community entered the debate on solving the insurgency problem in Cabo Delgado.
- **Significant deployment of FADM and FIR personnel**, followed by the deployment of two PMC’s in 2019, of which only one (DAG) could claim some degree of success, whilst the other (Wagner) were forced to withdraw.
- Government cooperating with Tanzanian authorities to tackle cross border crime (smuggling – likely funding the activities).
- Uganda has agreed to train PRM – drawing on own experience in fighting terrorism.

RESPONSE

GOVERNMENT, FADM, WAGNER, DAG, SURROUNDING COUNTRIES

- Assembly of the Republic approved **Law to Combat Terrorism** – introducing longer prison terms for offences, attorney-general has power to freeze financial resources.
- **Several FDS counter insurgency campaigns** were launched from early 2020, temporarily pushing insurgent towards the areas North of Pemba.
- **An unofficial media “black-out”** was imposed by the Government shortly after the first attacks in 2017, that has remained in place ever since.
- The Government **strengthened the DUAT Protection Forces**, responsible for securing the LNG on land works.

SECURITY FORCES

CAPABILITIES AND PREPAREDNESS – POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE

Positive	Negative
FDS deployments in Mueda, Macomia, Quissanga	35 month period – unable to take control
Prevented Pemba from falling to insurgents	Intelligence failure (tactical info leaked)
Drove insurgents out of Quissanga to the North	High numbers of FDS desertions
COIN attacks in central region	Abandoning bases, unable to defend bases (300 fled Mbau base)
	Most incidents initiated by insurgents
	Dilapidated equipment and inadequate resources
	Diminished command and control (PRM leading counter insurgency)
	Poor patrol procedures
	Inexperienced soldiers
	Some deployed from South (viewed as foreign)
	Government denials

SECURITY FORCES

CAPABILITIES AND PREPAREDNESS – NEGATIVE

Negative

Poor discipline

Drinking on the job (in uniform)

Reports of harassment of local community members

Reports of soldiers selling ammunition (even to militants in area)

Financial restraints

Lack of specialised vehicles for the terrain

HUMINT sources have expressed their doubts regarding the force’s capability and preparedness to tackle the situation in Cabo Delgado



SECURITY FORCES

HUMINT

“the saddest part of this incident is that the FADM ran away, literally they threw down their weapons and ran away” – Mocímboa da Praia Town and Port August attack

“the military commander in the province, does not have the will nor the military skills required to effectively fight a counter insurgency war”... “these forces simply do not have adequate equipment and training for the task at hand”

“operating in remote areas require super refined logistics and intelligence. In addition, the modus operandi of the “militants” characterized by infiltration and embeddedness in the community, challenges the ability of the security forces to define or identify the enemy in the field”

“the statutory forces in the conflict zone are for several different reasons not capable of containing the insurgency and they are certainly not winning that war”

“they do not have the capability, the FADM are corrupt, they lack proper equipment, the armament is not fit for purpose, there is no proper air support and they do not understand the concept of terrain dictates tactics”

“If you are fighting a faceless enemy, like in Cabo Delgado, you need to concentrate your effort on the population and support elements, the FADM is not doing this, they have no plan. The main reason why this is not happening is because the Mozambican Government does not have a National Security Strategy (“NSS”), in order to succeed such a strategy is vital, support for these militants is coming from somewhere”

“we hear to many tales of the statutory forces being drunk whilst armed and then becoming abusive towards the local population, in this regard it is perturbing that the statutory forces are to a significant degree dependent on the local population for food, there appears to be a serious problem with the command and control of these forces”

PMCs

LESSONS LEARNED

WAGNER GROUP – Russia	DYCK ADVISORY GROUP (DAG) – South Africa
Not effective	Effective only in part
Integration of forces problematic due to number of differences including: language, culture and training	No ground troops to support air attacks (i.e. no feedback on effect of air attacks and not able to hold ground)
Operational conditions are poor (i.e. living conditions, little or no actionable intel, no trust in battle)	Not able to distinguish between own, insurgent forces and civilians on the ground (uniforms and civilian dress)
Training on new technologies and weapons failed, and retraining undertaken after first battles against insurgents	Logistics problematic for helicopters
Poor planning, and command and control led to Wagner fatalities	Time over targets only 15 minutes due to distances to refuel
Wagner weapons training of the FDS soldiers led to poor performance on the battlefield, resulting in a retraining schedule	Successes are largely neutralised by reports of civilian killings
Wagner withdrew after five months and 11 losses	

ADDITIONAL AREA COMPLICATIONS

ENVIRONMENT, TRAVEL, COMMUNICATIONS, INFRASTRUCTURE

FOCUS GROUP

- **Foreigners are not viewed favourably** – Xenophobic attacks in SA could be problematic for SA intervention
- **Road access** in the conflict zone is limited to a single North-South tarmac, main road, and partial access by a secondary North/South coastal road.
 - Roads that are off the main roads going to the rural areas/villages are only suitable for 4x4 travel in the dry season.
- **Weather** – impact in PMCs (Wagner)
 - Many bridges are vulnerable to flooding in the rainy season, leading to villages and towns being cut off from supplies for weeks and months.
- Only the main towns are connected to the **national electrical grid** that is subject to **frequent outages**.
- Outlying rural areas **little or no cell phone coverage** – towers are switched off during attacks (e.g. Mocímboa da Praia attack started on 06/08 but towers only switched off on 08/08).

DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

POSSIBLE

PRE-DEPLOYMENT:

- Provide intelligence needed (enemy course of action) for planning, training, equipment needed, battle design and own forces course of action, for purposes of deploying to Mozambique.
- Support during the initial planning for deployment into Cabo Delgado (*i.e. providing enemy courses of action, MO, tactics, trends, locations (hotspots) etc.*)
- Keep operational planning (movement, deployments etc.) on a strict need to know basis.

DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

DURING DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT

DURING DEPLOYMENT:

- Evaluate, interpret tactical information provided by FDS
- Develop a tactical intelligence collection capacity/network in the field (i.e. focusing on locating insurgents and early warning).
- Liaison with Government intelligence organs
- Effective counterintelligence support
- In-country logistical support
- Facilitating liaison with higher statutory intelligence organisations
- Support in processing and interpreting operational information
- Regular travel advisories
- Route risk assessments
- Open and closed source monitoring

It is strongly advised that the SANDF/Special Forces have an independent operational Intelligence capability (i.e. SANDF cannot rely on tactical intelligence provided by the FDS – Wagner and DAG)

Reliant on FDS = failure


INFORMATION SERVICES

COMPLIMENTED BY HUMINT SOURCES

INFORMATION SERVICES


COMPREHENSIVE MAPPING SOFTWARE

- Customisable mapping capabilities that can provide a variety of map formats including Heat Maps, Incident Maps and Area Demographic Coverage
- Plotting and mapping of incidents and routes, including GPS Importing and Route Optimisation
- Accurate, clear and customisable graphical interface to facilitate understanding of geographical data



INFORMATION SERVICES

ADVANCED DATA ANALYSIS SOFTWARE



Network view example:
Indicating primary and secondary
role players, levels of activity and
targets

FOCUS GROUP

Q&A?

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